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AREAS OF DISPUTE IN
MEXICAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Cesar Sepulveda*
I. THE QUESTION OF CHAMIZAL
EFORE proceeding into an analysis of the Chamizal dispute as
it now exists, it is interesting to observe the deep faith which
the Mexican nation has placed in the process of arbitration through-
out the one hundred and twenty-five years of her independent life
and the firm devotion with which she has invoked this juridical
method of resolving controversies with other nations. During the
last century and in the first third of the present century-the period
coinciding with the development and decline of the arbitration in-
stitution-Mexico invoked the use of arbitration on several occa-
sions. She has held fast to her conviction that differences between the
members of the international community should be handled through
pacific, preferably legal, procedures.
In spite of Mexico's love of international justice, it is discouraging
to note the little fortune and lack of success that Mexico has had in
all instances. From the first arbitrations, that nation has been sub-
jected to discriminative treatment, imposition, and abuse. Often
she has been victim of the lack of preparation on the part of her
arbitrating proxies. Take, for example, a few relevant cases. The
1868 Commission awarded millions of dollars to W'eil and La Abra,
after rejecting the clearest evidence of fraud, and it took thirty-two
long years of laborious negotiations to retrieve that which had been
robbed from Mexico.1 Both at this Commission and the 1923-1934
Claims Commissions, the demands filed against Mexico were grossly
exaggerated, while at others, e.g., the 1839 Commission, nonexistent
or groundless cases were included. ' Finally, in the Clipperton (Isla
de la Pasion) case, it may well be concluded that Mexico was un-
justly deprived of her territorial rights in 1931 through an uncon-
vincing resolution, one that would never satisfy an unbiased jurist.'
12 Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United
States Has Been a Party § 1083, at 63-68 (1906); Sepulveda, Dos Reclamaciones Inter-
nacionales Fraudulentas contra Mdxico: Los Casos de Wel y de la Abra, Archivo Hist6rico
Diplomitico Mexicano (in press at this writing).
2 Sepulveda, Sobre Reclamaciones de Norteamericanos a Mixico, 42 Historia Mexicana
190-91 (1961). The legal adjudications reached an average of 2.6362% of the claimed
amounts. See generally Feller, The Mexican Claims Commissions, 1923-1934. The Commis-
sioner of Claims reached only an average of .4%. See generally Sepulveda, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 68.
'The judgment is contained in 26 Am. J. Int'l L. 390 (1932). For a commentary see
Dickinson, 27 Am. J. Int'l L. 130-37 (1938). Ralston, The Law and Procedure of Inter-
national Tribunals 155-56 (Supp.), openly criticizes the decision.
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What is surprising is that in spite of so much misfortune, Mexico
has been true to her dedication to international justice. Most worthy
of admiration is the fact that at no time have obligations deriving
from decisions adverse to that country remained unfulfilled.
Because of this background of cooperation in arbitrations, when
on June 15, 1911, a court of arbitration resolved that according to
the most generally accepted rules of international law, Mexico should
be awarded the Chamizal tract,' it was thought that law could pre-
vail over the most powerful nations. However, legal subterfuges
and the White House's dislike of the Mexican revolutionary gov-
ernments stood in the way, and the small tract of land was not re-
turned to its owner. The Mexican people made the subject a point
of honor and surrounded it with political sensitivity and with some
degree of exaggeration.
The existence of such conditions makes any measure of under-
standing difficult. The United States should not be accused of being
entirely reluctant to find a way to settle the problem. During the
years 1912 and 1913 rather weak proposals were submitted to the
Mexican government to exchange Chamizal for Barra del Horcon
and a certain sum of money. The Mexican administration under
Madero also proposed some methods of solution,' but conditions then
existing were not altogether favorable for negotiations. Yet, it can-
not be said that Mexico has displayed a great measure of activity
towards securing compliance with the arbitral award.
Two arguments were expounded by the United States for its
refusal to comply with the Chamizal arbitral decision. The first, of
a practical nature, was that the award had not specified the sites
along which the boundary line should pass. This premise, however,
lacked validity inasmuch as it was not the task of arbitration courts,
but of technical commissions, to determine a boundary line. Probably,
a little good will would have been sufficient to settle the matter.
The other argument was of a juridical character and more specious
than effective. It consisted of presenting the very subtle objection
that the arbitral compromise agreement had established that the
court was to decide on the whole of the Chamizal land; whereas, the
court had divided the tract in the award. Accordingly, the argument
ran, it was impossible to comply with the decision.
If both the agreement and the award are carefully analyzed, the
value of such an argument disappears. It was in fact resolved at the
'The settlement of the arbitration appears in 5 Am. J. Int'l L. 117 (Supp. 1911), the
award in 5 Am. J. Int'l L. 785 (1911).




1910 Convention by article III that "the Commission shall decide
solely and exclusively as to whether the international title to the
Chamizal tract is in the United States of America or Mexico."'
However, a correct interpretation will establish that the clause was
included to set the jurisdictional limits of the court so that matters
other than the territorial question of dominion over the Chamizal
would not be considered. In other words, those who drafted the
agreement intended that the arbitrators should be prevented from
considering such questions as territorial waters and the like. The
agreement in no way precluded the possibility of settling the matter
by application of the provisions of law most reasonable and proper
to the case.
On the other hand, even if it were accepted that the court did
not adhere to the agreement, such a circumstance would not give
rise to the exception of the abuse of right. That objection is reserved
for serious cases of procedural violation or deviations of power, not
for matters in which existing provisions are correctly applied and as
such offer a reasonable solution.7
The Chamizal question is, in any event, a matter of no easy
settlement. Otherwise, it would have been resolved long ago like
other important adjustments which have been made with relative
ease in the Mexican-American border on both sides of the Rio
Grande-adjustments which involved the transfer of tracts of land
much larger than the one under discussion. Thus, for example, by
the Convention of March 20, 1905, fifty-eight "bancos" (banks of
land left by receding waters) were mutually exchanged between
the two nations,' and in 1933, after rectifying, by virtue of a treaty,
the bed of the Rio Grande in the Juarez-El Paso area, a canal was
built that separated lands formerly possessed by each of the coun-
tries. The award given in the case of the "bancos" was consummated'
without further complication.
All of this is history. We shall now see what possibilities of settle-
ment exist for the Chamizal. The fullest and most satisfactory solu-
tion would be strict compliance with the 1911 arbitral award; that
is, the river line as it was in 1864 before the great flood should be
"Convention With Mexico for the Arbitration of the Chamizal Case, June 24, 1910,
art. III, 36 Stat. 2481, T.S. No. 555; 5 Am. J. Int'l L. 117, 120 (Supp. 1911).
7Kiss, L'Abuse de Droit en Droit International, Passim (1925); 1 Oppenheim, Inter-
national Law 345-47 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
8Convention With Mexico for the Elimination of Bancos in the Rio Grande From the
Effects of Article II of the Treaty of Nov. 12, 1884, March 20, 1905, 35 Stat. 1863, T.S.
No. 461.
'Convention With Mexico for the Rectification of the Rio Grande, Feb. 1, 1933, 48
Star. 1621, T.S. No. 864.
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localized as closely as possible and the applicable portion surrendered
to Mexico. This would put an end to old reproaches, enmities would
disappear, and the matter would reflect itself most favorably on
diplomatic relations between the two nations. This solution would
also provide the basis for subsequent settlements in connection with
other matters. If it remains unresolved, the point will necessarily
become more complicated.
Intelligent negotiations and good faith may in the end lead to
realizing some sort of mediative plan similar to that suggested by
Mr. Mann, the present United States Ambassador to Mexico. That
plan calls for the creation in the Zone of a new, more practical, and
less sinuous bed for the Rio Grande so that a part of Chamizal-that
which, after the change in the river bed, would be connected with
the adjacent Corte de Cordova-would then remain to the south of
the river. Also, Mexico would receive an American territorial tract
of the size equal to a total of 160 hectares (about 395 acres). Thus,
the tract of land coming to Mexico would be approximately the same
in size as that awarded by the 1911 arbitral commission.
To create a favorable atmosphere, Mexican public opinion should
first be carefully cultivated, for it abounds in well-justified suspicion.
The Mexican people need to be convinced of the advantages of re-
moving this cause of conflict and divergence. It may be difficult, but
it can be done.
I sincerely believe that if we succeeded in disposing of this un-
pleasant legacy, there would be a more favorable atmosphere in which
to conduct negotiations concerning other pressing questions. Hence,
an effort to terminate this disagreement is thoroughly warranted.
I1. THE PROBLEM OF THE COLORADO RIVER SALINE WATERS
The Treaty for the Distribution of the Waters from the Rio
Grande, Colorado, and Tijuana Rivers, of February 3, 1944,0
represents, so it seems, a reasonable agreement between Mexico and
the United States. The Republic of Mexico by means of this
international instrument would obtain a certain volume of water
which it previously had not received. The Treaty recognizes the
traditional principle that a river touching two or more countries
is an international river, that one state owes to the other state a
certain obligation in respect to the waters from those international
currents, and that these obligations should be defined to prevent
uncertainty and ill usage by one state to the detriment of the other
state.
10 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994.
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It must be said that the United States Government had to over-
come strong opposition from the western states of that Union to
secure ratification of the Treaty. Representatives of these states clung
to the one-sided, ultra-nationalistic view that the country upstream
has all of the rights, even to the point of abuse, to employ freely
those waters."
However, the Mexican jurists of the time failed to see, or for
some reason overlooked, two important things. First, according to
well-established provisions of the law of nations, Mexico was un-
questionably entitled to a considerable part of the waters from the
Colorado River. Second, the 1944 Treaty actually froze at a very
low level, irretrievably perhaps, Mexican rights in these waters by
not providing for the growth of communities that later might need
the water downstream in Lower California or in Sonora.
Be that as it may, the Waters Treaty of 1944 proved to be a good
instrument, indeed an operative and reasonable one, until certain
interests in the state of Arizona initiated a process whereby the water
became polluted. Large tracts of land in that state were "washed"
by flooding them with river water. The water was then returned
to the Colorado River with the resulting waste. The salt content in
the water, which had already increased as a consequence of drought
and evaporation, reached such a level that the water became unfit for
any use. Since the pollution was not known in due time, it caused
numerous Mexican cotton lands to become impaired, perhaps per-
manently. Losses in the region have been considerable and have seri-
ously affected the Mexican economy. There is little doubt that the
"washing" program in Arizona has caused the uncertainty as to the
effectiveness of the Treaty and, in the eyes of many, has converted
it into an instrument of wavering validity.
It is discouraging to observe that in spite of the unquestionable
progress of international law and the great number of treaties for
the pacific settlement of controversies to which both Mexico and
the United States are parties, it has not been possible so far to find
a solution with respect to the saline waters. Of course, any settle-
ment should not only be with a view to the future, but also it should
reflect efforts to make up for the past damages.
This question, like all matters related to boundaries, has a highly
emotional content that could adversely degenerate and eventually
threaten all methods designed for the peaceful settling of con-
troversies. It is also a matter that weighs heavily on all Mexican-
" Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pts.
1-4 (1945).
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American relations, inasmuch as the Treaty is a very important part
of the present system of mutual understanding.
Ever since the time of Washington's three rules, the principle has
been incorporated in public international law that one state cannot
use its territory to cause damage, negligently or intentionally, to
the rights of another country. Noble rules, like the one mentioned,
found their way into the practice of nations and gave birth to in-
stitutions such as the limitation of a nation's sovereignty in territorial
matters, the international community of interests, and, as a conse-
quence, the institution of the abuse of rights. Both international
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States have on numerous
occasions paid homage to these precepts," the reason being that they
are not only true rules of natural law but also rules that evince
a practice that is generally accepted as law. Nevertheless, even at the
current high point in the institutional progress of the law of nations
and the international community, there remain men who try to find a
reason to justify an action of this sort, which, originating in their
own territory, turns to the detriment of another state.
In the present case there exist a number of clearly defined obliga-
tions of a contractual nature. Like all international agreements, the
Waters Treaty is ruled by that same good faith which governs the
exercise of any rights derived from a treaty itself. We, the Mexican
jurists, understand that when a treaty is signed between nations
and contractual obligations are assumed, any practices or individual
rights conflicting with such obligations are to be restricted, if not
altogether eliminated. Also, it is inherent in the doctrine of good
faith that any rights deriving from a treaty should be exercised
reasonably and in a manner that is proper and necessary for ac-
complishing the specified purpose. Treaties, then, must be equitable
for both parties; one should not strive to secure advantage beyond
that measure.
Any departure from the equilibrium between the respective inter-
ests and rights is a deviation from the original purpose of the treaty,
an abuse of rights, and a violation of duty. A structure of rights and
duties in which fair play and good will are not observed is logically
and practically useless. The interpretation of this treaty, in the light
of the customary rules of hermeneutics and the principles of good
1"See, e.g., The Trail Smelter Case, 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941);
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336
(1931); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902),
206 U.S. 46 (1906); Societ6 Energie Electrique v. Compagnia Impreses Elettriche Liguri
(Corte di Cassazione di Italia 1939), in Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases
120 (1938-1940). Concerning the doctrine of abuse of rights, see Cheng, General Principles
of Law 121 (1953).
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neighborhood, equity, community of interests, and good faith, pre-
cludes any preferential privilege in favor of one party and, most
certainly, all abuses.
It is, therefore, with alarm that we realize that a degree of in-
transigency exists and that no effort to control such actions has been
made. Our apprehension is heightened when we consider that the
Treaty affords a regime that is adequate to take corrective measures
grounded on good neighborhood. 3 We are nonetheless confident that
since there is involved a mere exegesis calling for the good disposi-
tion of the United States Government and the setting aside of certain
political interests, the principle of loyalty to treaties will prevail
in the end. When such good faith does exist, a great step will be
taken towards eliminating another most unpleasant chapter in the
history of the relations between the two countries.
III. FISHING ON THE GULF
There was in 1935 and 1936 an unpleasant, violent clash between
the two nations-this time on the Pacific-in connection with the
fish that were being used as a bait for tuna. However, it was pos-
sible to mend things more or less satisfactorily.' Now the same ques-
tion has arisen in connection with the shrimp shoals that are migrating
in the Gulf of Mexico toward the Mexican coasts of Sonda de Cam-
peche and thereby depleting the shores of Florida, Louisiana, and
Texas of an abundant supply. The problem may spread because of
the shortage of other sea products or because of the concurrence of
third powers now coveting the fishing resources in the Gulf. The
controversy has moved within the confines of the old debate about
the three-mile territorial waters rule and has become aggravated as
a consequence of the failure to seek a decent solution to this latter
type of problem.
Today, after considering the codification work done by the Inter-
national Law Commission on sea resources and by the two Geneva
"aArticle 24 of the Treaty, op. cit. supra note 10, establishes that the International
Boundary and Water Commission shall have the power and duty:
(d) To settle all differences that may arise between the two Governments with
respect to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, subject to the ap-
proval of the two Governments. In any case in which the Commissioners do
not reach an agreement, they shall so inform their respective governments re-
porting their respective opinions and the grounds therefor and the points upon
which they differ, for discussion and adjustment of the difference through
diplomatic channels and for application where proper of the general or special
agreements which the two governments have concluded for the settlement
of controversies.
"See an account of the controversy in I Hackworth, Digest of International Law 639-42
(1940).
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conferences on sea questions, no international jurist will doubt that
the so-called three-mile rule is an ancient relic and that rules having
a greater general assent are at present necessary for the modern in-
ternational community." It now appears that the three-mile argu-
ment is a political expedient rather than a legal provision.
Moreover, Mexican jurists maintain that as far as the United
States is concerned the correct off-shore distance should be at least
a nine nautical mile width. This principle has been included in
international instruments executed between the two nations and,
therefore, has been'part of our laws for decades.1" If we are to talk
of an international custom, we have here all of the elements needed
to construct a clear definite rule of behavior. From this perspective
the matter does not call for discussion: the territorial sovereignty of
the Mexican State reaches into the sea as far as three nautical leagues.
These statements have been made briefly in connection with the
extension of territorial waters. However, it should be observed that
two notions calling for separate treatment have traditionally been
intermingled. In fact, the notion of the width of the marginal sea
corresponds to an idea of safety and territorial supremacy; whereas,
fishing is related to the preservation and utilization of renewable
natural resources. To put it differently, for the sake of technical
purity and at this stage in the development of international law,
questions of territorial policy should not be mixed with those of
natural resources, especially at this time when a fatal Malthusianism
is observed. It is high time to treat the matters separately, for the
fishing question is and must be of itself an independent problem.
The Truman Proclamation in 1945 must be viewed as an expres-
sion of progress in the matter of fishing rights and also as an acknowl-
edgement of the general principle that a state which has a coastline
as its border maintains priority over the fishing resources that origi-
nate within its territorial seas. Furthermore, the doctrine recognizes
that this priority spreads toward the adjacent regions or the open
sea and over the species living in that zone as well. The Truman
Proclamation was, beyond doubt, both a warning about and a
15 See Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished,
52 Am. J. Int'l Law 607, 614-15 (1958). The United States presented its standard three-
mile limit proposal to the conference but the necessary two-thirds support was lacking. As
a compromise a six-mile limit was then proposed with the right of the coastal state to
regulate fishing for another six miles subject to certain historical fishing rights. Although
this proposal did not receive the two-thirds vote required for adoption, it received more
votes than any other proposal.
" See, e.g., the following Mexican statutes: The Law of Federal Property 1902, amended,
1935; The Law of Natural Property art. 176 (1944); see also Sepulveda, Curso de Derecho
Internacional Pfblico 139-42 (1960).
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starting point towards the modern thesis of the community of
interests in oceanic fisheries.
Much talk is heard about the contingent international right of
fishing on the open sea, and too much emphasis has been laid upon
the fact that such a right has become a consuetudinary rule which
takes precedence over the right to control fisheries in the off-shore
waters. It is possible that this practice, sporadically adhered to by
a limited number of powers, will be appealed to as a general rule of
the law of nations. However, it should not in reason be accepted
as such for it lacks the requirements exacted under modern interna-
tional law for a custom to become a legal provision. Its character as
a rule accepted by general assent is quite dubious.
In contrast with such an unwarranted claim, the more generally
accepted right of maintaining and preserving fishing resources and
protecting them against abuse is evidently more just. These fishing
areas are in fact not the wealth of only one nation that has available
means for their development but the common property of mankind;
no one is entitled to appropriate them to himself alone. However,
as long as the other nations do not approach the country whose
boundaries border the coastline, the latter country holds a right of
preference in such resources and may exclude other states.
These ideas have seemingly been endorsed by most nations and
were the inspiring principle of the Convention on Fishing and Con-
servation of the Living Resources of the High Seas17 subscribed to
at Geneva in 1958 by more than thirty nations. Under such con-
ditions, therefore, I cannot see at present how the Mexican claim to
reserve fishing within the adjacent zones and even on certain areas of
the open sea is open to objection. Such a practice is in agreement
with the most widely accepted rules of international law.
As far as the United States is concerned, no obstacle precludes
settlement of this question on the basis of conventions which would
affirm the rights of Mexico and allow, at the same time, a reasonable
fishing development in the disputed zones. There are a number of
antecedents that permit us to conclude that an understanding in
this respect can and will be feasibly reached. Thus, for example,
Mexico concluded in 1949, at the petition of the United States,
the Treaty for establishing an International Commission for the
Scientific Investigation of the Tuna 8 that served later as a basis
for the agreement between Costa Rica and the United States (the
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission) in 1951.
17 U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.B/L.54 (1958).
" 99 U.N.T.S. No. 1367, at 3.
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The State Department itself has suggested this approach on several
occasions," and such a step would be in accord with the common
desire to avoid extinction of sea species and to find sufficient food for
the peoples of the world. It is, moreover, in keeping with the modern
theses of the community of interests and the maximum resource
development.
It is evident that an excellent opportunity is being overlooked to
settle permanently this dispute over the Mexican rights in fishing,
while the intrusion of third nations, and even of other continents-
which fact will lead to serious problems-is being tolerated. It is
discouraging to observe how energies are being dissipated and how
manifest is our absence of foresight.
IV. FOREIGN OIL-PROSPECTING IN TERRITORIAL WATERS
AND ALONG THE MEXICAN CONTINENTAL SHELF
The area of foreign oil-explorations has left a bitter taste in Mexi-
can mouths. With reluctance, yet facing the inevitable, Mexico had to
nationalize the petroleum industry, thereby opening a new era in
the law of nations."0 Notwithstanding the fact that compensations
were quite onerous and did not seem to be warranted, the Republic of
Mexico, to the serious detriment of the national economy, punctually
paid a total of 175 million dollars indemnity.2 American companies
received 45 million dollars from 1943 to 1949, British companies,
130 million dollars from 1946. The last installment was paid
August 31, 1962.
Mexico rapidly became a victim to the unfair attitude assumed in
the face of her well-meant effort to pay such a tremendous in-
demnity. As a result, Mexico had to undergo long years of boycott,
discrimination, suspicion, and indifference. The nationalizaton was
viewed by the powers as a menacing gesture of an unruly socialism
and as a threat to the security of the system of private property.
However, if we look unbiasedly into the matter, little choice was
left to the Mexican State. Her prestige and her sovereign integrity
were at stake: both were threatened by intransigent, monopolistic
corporations.
Although such attitudes have been overcome, and they were never
'0 Harrington, U.S. Policy on Fisheries and Territorial Waters, 26 Dep't State Bull. 1021,
1022 (1952).
" See White, Nationalization of Foreign Property (1961). The problems of expropriation
of foreign property, although they have presented themselves on occasions, have had neither
the uniformity nor the systematization achieved by the Mexican oil expropriations.
"
1The figures can be found in Cline, The United States and Mexico 247-51 (1953).
" Excelsior, Sept. 1, 1962.
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in harmony with an integrated international community, traces of
the unfair treatment remain. The effects can be detected by sub-
tracting from the country's development program, needed sums of
money which went to pay the pressing indemnities. In addition there
is a deeply embedded psychological attitude. The Mexican people
still believe that they had to pay for something that belonged to
the nation in the first place, viz., their own petroleum, since all of
the property of these nationalized corporations came from the ex-
ploitation of Mexican natural resources.
All of these antecedents as well as reasonable planning for the
utilization of non-renewable resources have led to Mexican legisla-
tive provisions that place solely in the hands of the Republic the
prospecting, exploitation, refining, and distribution of hydrocarbons. 3
The question of continental shelves has worried internationalists
for the last few decades. Although not without some dissension, it
can now be reasonably maintained that a country bordering on a
seashore has the jurisdiction and control of the natural resources
located in the continental shelf, including, of course, the important
resource of hydrocarbons. Here too, the Truman Proclamation re-
sulted in a series of theories and rules that in the end became a
general principle at the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf in 1958. Just like so many other nations, Mexico has made
laws reserving these resources for the nation.24
With all the antecedents mentioned above, there does not seem
to be any possibility of ever granting to foreigners the right to ex-
ploit the resources in the off-shore zone. Mexico has shown itself
to be jealous and nationalistic with some reason, and the present
trend is towards government intervention in all oil utilization pro-
grams. Prospecting by foreign companies could place in foreign
hands a monopoly of knowledge about the existence and location
of these hydrocarbons.
It is, however, curious to observe that the very man who, according
to well informed sources, originated President Truman's statement,
Mr. Pauley, the famous petroleum industrialist, is at present the only
one who retains a number of grants for prospecting along the con-
tinental shelf and the tidelands. This paradox is well worth the
"3 Amendments to the Federal Constitution of Mexico, Jan. 20, 1960; Sepulveda, A
Statement of the Laws of Mexico 145-47 (1961); Amendment to Article 27 of the Federal
Constitution of Mexico, Nov. 29, 1958; Sepulveda, Commentary on the Amendments to
Articles 27, 47, and 48 of the Constitution, Scope and Extent, 30-31 El Foro (July-Dec.
1960).
24 See Sepulveda, Commentary, supra note 23.
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mention. It seems, however, that the undertaking has not been
successful and that no further grants will be given in the future.
As a final note, it is in this field that the United Nations' tech-
nical assistance programs could be of benefit in permitting a reason-
able exploitation of the mineral resources in the depths off the
coasts of Mexico, with Mexican-owned elements.
V. FINAL COMMENTS
Relations between Mexico and the United States are friendly at
present, and there has been understanding in numerous aspects.
Some adjustments, however, still remain to be effected in order to
eliminate certain unpleasant situations or to carry those relations to
an optimum. An effort is required to terminate such pending ques-
tions as Chamizal, fishing, and the saline waters. This effort is de-
manded by good sense and the harmony that should exist between
mutually respecting neighbors. It is up to us, the jurists of one and
the other country, to advance the best suited methods to terminate
these differences that cast a shadow over good relations and remain
as barriers to agreements in other areas of dispute.
1963 ]
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